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 COMMENT
 PATRICIA MUNCH
 The Rand Corporation
 Professor Fuchs identifies three alleged irrationalities in the purchase of
 health insurance. The first is the widespread and growing tendency of gov-
 ernments to mandate or subsidize health insurance, encouraging an over-
 utilization of health care. The second is the propensity of individuals to
 purchase first dollar insurance coverage even in the private market. The
 third is Leonard Woodcock's support of National Health Insurance (NHI).
 These are all supposedly evidence of a persistent overindulgence in the
 purchase of health insurance.'
 The second piece of "evidence," irrational behavior in the private pur-
 chase of health insurance, may be disposed of quickly by demonstrating its
 nonexistence. Theory predicts that the degree of insurance coverage pur-
 chased by risk averse consumers will be positively related to the mean and
 variance of the distribution of expected losses. The degree of coverage of
 health care expenditures may be crudely measured by either out-of-pocket
 expense as a per cent of total expense (the coinsurance rate) or the reduction
 in variance achieved by insurance. The measure used by Professor Fuchs,
 that is, the number of privately held hospital insurance policies covering
 first-day hospitalization relative to the number covering long-term stays, is
 not appropriate because it ignores non-hospital items of health expenditure.
 Data from a 1970 national survey of medical expenditures shows that, for
 persons with annual medical expenses under $150, only 7 per cent was paid
 by insurance, and this percentage rises monotonically to 76 per cent for
 persons with annual expenses over $1,500.2 Similarly, insurance covers a
 larger fraction of hospital expenses than expenses for doctor office visits,
 where the average total expense is lower. The per cent of variability (mea-
 sured by the standard deviation of total expense) removed by insurance is
 greater for hospital expenses (59 per cent) than for doctor office visits (42 per
 cent).3 Thus, the evidence is entirely consistent with economic theory.
 I Victor R. Fuchs, From Bismarck to Woodcock: The "Irrational" Pursuit of National
 Health Insurance, 19 J. Law & Econ. 347 (1976).
 2 These estimates are drawn from the analysis by Charles E. Phelps of data from household
 interview surveys, conducted in 1970 by the University of Chicago's Center for Health Adminis-
 tration Studies, reprinted in Charles E. Phelps, Private Health Insurance: A Special Report, 6
 AMA Update (1974).
 3 These figures are for those with group insurance. The same pattern, at lower levels,
 emerges for those with nongroup insurance.
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 Turning now to the first point, which is the primary focus of the paper: it
 is asserted that insurance reduces the price the consumer faces at the time of
 purchase of medical care and, therefore, induces excessive demand. In the
 absence of perfect experience rating, this applies equally to private insur-
 ance for medical care and for any insured activity or event with a nonzero
 price elasticity of demand. People buy insurance voluntarily because insur-
 ance buys reduction in risk, in addition to medical care. The value of this
 risk reduction is presumably equal at the margin to the discrepancy between
 costs and benefits of medical care consumed plus the loading charge.
 Thus NHI need not entail a welfare loss. The potential for a welfare loss
 arises only if the level of coverage under NHI exceeds that which would be
 purchased in the private market. Even in that case, the resulting level of
 consumption of medical care is not necessarily excessive. It is not inconceiv-
 able that in the absence of a subsidy the amount purchased would be subop-
 timal, due to monopoly pricing by physicians and other factors of produc-
 tion. Subsidizing health insurance would then induce a movement in the
 right direction, if not by the right amount or by the cheapest means.
 Let us assume, however, that NHI does typically lead to an excessive
 consumption of medical care as defined by the private demand curves of
 individual consumers of medical care. Professor Fuchs then tries to identify
 sources of social gain, that is, gain to members of society other than the
 direct consumer, to offset this welfare loss. A basic problem with this ap-
 proach to explaining the survival of NHI is that it presupposes a model of
 political decision-making that is probably unrealistic. It is only valid if polit-
 ical outcomes reflect the same weighting of preferences as do market out-
 comes. Given a one-man-one-vote endowment in the political sector, this
 will hold only if it is costless to buy and sell votes. One of the major contribu-
 tions of George Stigler has been to focus attention on imperfections in the
 political market as a source of political decisions that are not necessarily
 Pareto optimal, and hence are apparently irrational by the Pareto optimal-
 ity calculus.4
 Eschewing this approach, Professor Fuchs identifies several potential
 sources of social gain from NHI. One is to control provider prices. If this
 were the main goal, surely it would be infinitely cheaper to abolish the
 government-created supports to monopoly in the medical sector. More plaus-
 ible is the argument that medical care may have some public-good aspects
 which make its consumption valuable to others besides the immediate
 consumer. If this indirect demand is sufficiently widespread, then it may be
 efficient to fund the additional consumption by taxation rather than volun-
 tary philanthropy. The public-good aspects need not be confined to the
 contagiousness of disease or the desire to equalize life expectancy, and are
 4 For example, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. of Econ.
 & Man. Sci. 3 (1971).
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 19:22:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 COMMENT 367
 not proved nonexistent by demonstrating that most of modern medical care
 is not related to these particular concerns. It is well known that health affects
 productivity in the market as well as the nonmarket sector. It is also not hard
 to believe that medical care enhances health, at least at the low levels of
 consumption of heath care by those whose consumption would be stimulated
 most by a move to compulsory coverage. Thus, it is invalid to look at the
 mean marginal product of medical care for the population as a whole in
 looking for the gain in moving to compulsory universal coverage. Consump-
 tion will be stimulated, and the potential for welfare loss exists only for those
 who consume more under mandatory coverage than they would purchase
 voluntarily. The marginal product of medical care for these individuals is
 likely to be well above the average for society as a whole. Thus, if a society
 accepts responsibility for some minimum level of economic well-being for its
 members, subsidizing health care may be an efficient form of welfare.5
 The alleged increase in the level of this subsidy over time does not require
 that altruism be income-elastic. In the absence of a subsidy, the relative
 access of some groups in society to medical care may become increasingly
 unfavorable. The reason for this is that as insurance coverage becomes more
 widespread, the demand for medical care by those with insurance becomes
 more inelastic. Optimum prices charged by monopolistic physicians then
 increase.6 In the absence of perfect price discrimination, prices faced by the
 uninsured will also tend to increase and their consumption of medical care
 fall. It is also likely that those with low income will be disproportionately
 represented among the uninsured. This is because the cost of insurance is
 higher for those without regular employment, even in the absence of any
 subsidy to employer-purchased insurance such as currently exists in the U.S.
 Group insurance enjoys cost advantages, in addition to any administrative
 economies of scale, because of saving on the costs of identifying the risk
 status of each individual in the group. If the group is formed for purchases
 other than the purchase of health insurance, it can be assumed to constitute a
 random sample from the population of that social status, so its expected
 expenditures on medical care are cheap to estimate. The loading fee will,
 therefore, be small relative to that charged on individual policies or to
 groups formed specifically for the purchase of health insurance, where there
 is a possibility of adverse selection. One of the advantages of compulsory
 national coverage is the savings due to eliminating the need to check the risk
 status of each individual by eliminating the possibility of adverse selec-
 tion.
 Thus, in the absence of NHI it is possible that the consumption of medical
 s The question of whether the subsidy in kind achieves this goal more efficiently than would a
 simple income transfer remains unanswered.
 6 Martin S. Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 251
 (1973).
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 care by low income groups in society will fall in relative and even absolute
 terms. For them, the marginal product of health care may be very high, and
 subsidizing their consumption may be an efficient alternative to other wel-
 fare programs. However, at least in the U.S., subsidization of health insur-
 ance is not confined to low income groups. The tax deductible status of
 health insurance premiums constitutes a regressive subsidy since the subsidy
 rate rises with the marginal tax rate. This requires some explanation other
 than altruism.
 Finally, let me turn briefly to the other puzzles mentioned by Professor
 Fuchs. In assessing the rationality, in terms of self-interest, of United Auto-
 mobile Workers' (UAW) support of NHI, it is surely necessary to look at the
 changes in costs as well as benefits under the particular proposal they sup-
 port relative to the pre-NHI position. The various NHI proposals currently
 under consideration differ not only in the extent of the benefits, but also in
 the incidence of the taxes used to finance them. It is possible that the burden
 of costs might be shifted sufficiently to offset any loss in value of benefits to
 members of a group such as the UAW.
 However, while redistributive gains might explain why a particular group
 supports a particular NHI scheme, if we adhere to the assumption that
 political markets function perfectly, this cannot explain a political decision
 in which the redistributive effects sum to a negative net outcome, as a
 general subsidy to health insurance seems likely to do. As suggested previ-
 ously, an alternative explanation is that the political market does not func-
 tion like the free market. This assumption usually prompts one to look for
 concentrated producer interests that dominate dispersed consumer interests.
 One reason Professor Fuchs rejects this model is that physicians opposed
 Medicare and Medicaid although their income subsequently rose relative to
 wages in general, and oppose NHI although it would increase the demand
 for medical care. But the model predicts that producer support for a stimulus
 to demand for their product will depend on their ability to capture the value
 of the increased demand. If government health care budgets are set at a level
 which does not cover the cost of the unconstrained increase in demand
 generated by NHI, producers will be unable to capture the potential rent.7 It
 will be dissipated in nonprice rationing devices such as higher time costs of
 patients. It is, therefore, not surprising that physicians would support a
 general subsidy to health insurance such as that implied by the tax deduct-
 ible status of premiums, but oppose a form of subsidy constrained by a line
 item in the federal budget, such as is likely for NHI. Second, producer
 support for government intervention is predicted to be inversely related to
 7 For international comparisons of physician earnings and expenditures on health care, see
 Joseph P. Newhouse & George A. Goldberg, Allocation of Resources in Medical Care from an
 Economic Viewpoint: Remarks to the XXIX World Assembly of the World Medical Associa-
 tion and Commentary (Rand Corp. P-5590, Feb. 1976).
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 their ability to restrict entry and set monopoly prices in the absence of
 government intervention. Medical providers seem quite able to maintain
 noncompetitive prices under existing arrangements. Their demand for a
 regulatory body to enforce cartel prices is, therefore, not surprisingly, low.
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